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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-4298 
___________ 
 
SAN NHO, a/k/a San Joo; H.N.; M.N., 
 
SAN NHO; H.N.; M.N., 
Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A096-148-950; A096-148-951; A096-148-952) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 28, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Petitioners seek review of a final order of removal of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”).  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
I. 
 Petitioners San Nho and her children, H.N. and M.N., are natives and citizens of 
South Korea.  In August 2002, Petitioners entered the United States as nonimmigrant 
visitors with permission to remain in the United States until February 2003.  In 
November 2002, Petitioners filed an application for adjustment of status based on Lead 
Petitioner’s approved immigrant petition for an alien worker.1 
 In December 2004, Petitioners appeared for an interview at the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) field office in Newark, New Jersey.  At the end of that 
interview, DHS requested that Petitioners submit certain documentation in support of 
their application for adjustment of status.  However, in February 2005, Petitioners 
requested to withdraw their application without prejudice.  The United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) granted Petitioners’ request. 
 In February 2005, Petitioners re-filed their adjustment of status application.  
USCIS denied it, concluding that Petitioners did not qualify for adjustment of status 
                                                 
1
 Lead Petitioner’s employer filed the petition on her behalf. 
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under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 245(k) , 8 U.S.C. § 1255.2  In 
December 2005, Petitioners filed again for adjustment of status and USCIS denied their 
application for the same reason.  In September 2006, Petitioners filed their fourth 
application for adjustment of status, which USCIS denied on the basis that lead Petitioner 
failed to submit a visa screen certificate with the application. 
 In April 2007, Petitioners were served with Notices to Appear, charging them with 
removability under INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as aliens present in the 
United States whose nonimmigrant visas had been revoked.  Petitioners again applied for, 
and were denied, adjustment of status.  In February 2008, Petitioner appeared in 
Immigration Court and requested voluntary departure (through former counsel).  The 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted Petitioners’ request for voluntary departure until 
June 25, 2008, with an alternate order of removal to South Korea if they failed depart by 
that date.  Petitioners did not depart from the United States and did not appeal from the 
IJ’s order. 
 On June 24, 2008, one day before the expiration of the voluntary departure period, 
Petitioners, through current counsel, moved to withdraw the voluntary departure order.  
They also filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings.  Petitioners claimed that 
they had “an independent and legitimate basis” for pursuing reopening because 
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 “An alien who is eligible to receive an immigrant visa . . . may adjust status . . . if 
the alien, subsequent to [a] lawful admission has not, for an aggregate period exceeding 
180 days . . . failed to maintain, continuously, a lawful status.”  See INA § 245(k)(2), 8 
U.S.C. § 1255(k)(2). 
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Petitioners were afforded ineffective assistance of counsel by their former attorney.  
(Administrative Record “A.R.” at 116-17.)  Petitioners also stated that upon reopening of 
their removal proceedings, they were planning to renew their adjustment of status 
application because they remained eligible for such relief.  (Id. at 118.) 
 In July 2008, the IJ issued a decision granting Petitioners’ motion to withdraw 
voluntary departure, but denying their motion to reopen.  The IJ noted that pursuant to 
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008), Petitioners were “entitled to withdraw their motion 
for voluntary departure, provided the request is made before expiration of the departure 
period, without regard to the underlying merits of the motion to reopen.”  (A.R. 110.)  
Because Petitioners filed their motion on June 24, 2008 – one day before their voluntary 
departure period expired on June 25, 2008 – the IJ granted their request to withdraw 
voluntary departure. 
 The IJ found that Petitioners’ motion to reopen was untimely because they filed it 
more than ninety days after the final administrative order had been entered in their case.  
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).  He also determined that equitable tolling was not 
warranted because Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Matter 
of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), for bringing an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim against their former attorney.  See also Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 
403 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005) (outlining those requirements); Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 129 
(3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “the Lozada requirements are a reasonable exercise of the 
Board’s discretion.”).  Lastly, the IJ determined that Petitioners failed to present evidence 
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that they were eligible to adjust their status because USCIS previously determined that 
Petitioners had been out of valid immigration status for more than 180 days. 
 In an October 2010 decision, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ 
motion to reopen and dismissed their appeal.  The Board found that the IJ correctly 
granted Petitioners’ motion to withdraw their voluntary departure, and agreed that 
Petitioners’ motion to reopen was untimely filed and that equitable tolling was not 
warranted.  The Board also rejected Petitioners’ argument that the IJ erred in determining 
that they were ineligible for adjustment of status.  Petitioners timely petitioned for review 
of the Board’s decision. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the denial of a 
motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Under this standard, we may reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Petitioners argue on appeal that:  (1) the Board abused its discretion when it 
affirmed the IJ’s denial of their motion to reopen as untimely filed; (2) the Board erred in 
finding that they were not eligible to renew their adjustment of status application before 
the IJ and, in doing so, violated their due process rights.  After carefully reviewing the 
record, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in affirming the 
Immigration Judge’s decision. 
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 Petitioners first argue that under Dada, their motion to reopen was timely because 
they filed it, along with their request to withdraw the voluntary departure order, before 
the voluntary departure period expired.  “A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days 
of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion.”  
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).  Because the IJ granted an order of voluntary departure on 
February 26, 2008, and Petitioners did not appeal the IJ’s decision, Petitioners’ ninety 
day period to file a motion to reopen expired on May 26, 2008.  See 8.C.F.R. § 1003.39; 
Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2004) (“the regulatory deadline for the 
filing of a motion to reopen runs from the date of the entry of the order of deportation, 
and not from the date that the period of voluntary departure expires.”).  Petitioners did 
not file their motion to reopen until June 24, 2008.  However, they claim that Dada made 
it “clear” that when a motion to reopen is filed “within the voluntary departure period, the 
motion should be considered.”  (See Petitioner’s Brief (“Pet. Br.”) at 18.) 
 We agree with the Board that Dada does not support Petitioners’ assertion that the 
deadline for Petitioners’ motion to reopen should have been the voluntary departure date, 
and not ninety days subsequent to the order of removal.  In Dada, the BIA affirmed an 
IJ’s grant of voluntary departure, ordering Dada to depart within thirty days.  Dada, 554 
U.S. at 6.  Before the end of that period, Dada sought to withdraw his voluntary departure 
request and filed a timely motion to reopen removal proceedings.  Id. at 6-7  After the 
voluntary departure period expired, the BIA denied Dada’s request, holding that an alien 
who has been granted voluntary departure but does not depart within the voluntary 
 7 
departure period is statutorily barred from receiving a status adjustment.  Id. at 7.  The 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that an “alien must be permitted to 
withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before expiration of the departure 
period, without regard to the underlying merits of the motion to reopen.”  Id. at 21. 
 Here, the IJ complied with Dada by allowing the Petitioners to withdraw the 
voluntary departure order because they sought to do so before the departure period 
expired.  However, contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, Dada does not hold that an agency 
is required consider a motion to reopen without regard to the ninety day filing deadline 
when it allows the alien to withdraw voluntary departure.  Accordingly, the Board did not 
abuse its discretion in holding that Petitioners’ motion to reopen was untimely filed.3  
Having found that the BIA did not err in denying Petitioners’ motion as untimely, we 
need not reach Petitioners’ other argument. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                 
3
 Petitioners do not argue on appeal that the BIA erred in determining that they did 
not qualify for equitable tolling.  As a result, the issue is not reviewable.  See Chen v. 
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). 
